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ARTICLE
Characterizing the Preferences and Values of U.S. Recreational Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna Anglers
William M. Goldsmith,* Andrew M. Scheld, and John E. Graves
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, College of William & Mary, Post Office Box 1346, Gloucester Point,
Virginia 23062, USA
Abstract
The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Thunnus thynnus is the target of a recreational fishery along the U.S. East Coast that
is thought to be of considerable economic value. In some years, recreational landings have exceeded the sector’s
annual subquota due to changes in fish availability, limited predictability of angler effort, and difficulties in real-time
monitoring of catch. Understanding the drivers of angler behavior is critical for predicting how effort and harvest may
vary as a function of changing fish availability, regulations, or costs. To investigate angler decision making, prefer-
ences, and values, we surveyed private recreational anglers from Maine to North Carolina and employed discrete
choice experiments to determine how regulatory and nonregulatory trip-specific variables influence trip-taking behav-
ior. A latent class-ranked logit model identified two distinct classes of anglers who exhibited differing preferences in
regard to the importance of nonconsumptive aspects of Bluefin Tuna fishing (e.g., catch and release). Income and
recent Bluefin Tuna targeting were the primary determinants of class membership, and higher-income anglers who
had targeted Bluefin Tuna in the past 5 years were significantly more likely to be in the class that derives substantive
benefits from nonconsumptive angling activities. An annual consumer surplus exceeding US$14 million was estimated
for the 2015 fishery. We considered potential angler welfare impacts of possible management changes (compensating
surplus) and identified a large amount of latent effort currently present in the fishery in the form of consumptive-
oriented anglers. As a result, liberalization of harvest regulations could potentially lead to a large influx of effort into
the fishery, which could impede the ability of managers to maintain harvest levels within prescribed limits.
Over the past several decades, resource management
scholars have advocated for better integration of the social
sciences into fisheries management (Voiland and Dut-
tweiler 1984; Fenichel et al. 2013). Understanding the
human component of fisheries is important for predicting
how management actions will affect the well-being of fish-
ery participants, as well as for informing the allocation of
fishery resources among competing user groups (Orbach
1980). In addition, without properly understanding the
preferences and motivations of anglers, predicting behav-
ioral responses (e.g., effort and harvest) is difficult and
can potentially undermine management’s effectiveness and
threaten a fishery’s sustainability (Fulton et al. 2011; Feni-
chel et al. 2013; Hunt et al. 2013). Fishing behavior may,
for example, change as stock status or management strate-
gies change, and simply extrapolating past behavior under
different conditions could lead to inaccurate predictions
(Fulton et al. 2011). Furthermore, while determining the
preferences and motivations of recreational anglers is chal-
lenging (compared with commercial fishers, who are often
thought to be largely motivated by profit), understanding
drivers of angler behavior for a given fishery is critical for
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ensuring that the fishery’s benefits are being maximized
(Fedler and Ditton 1994).
The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Thunnus thynnus supports a
popular private and for-hire recreational fishery along the
eastern coast of the United States from Maine to North
Carolina (Marcek and Graves 2014). Of the Bluefin Tuna
quota allocated to the United States by the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT), 19.7% (195.2 metric tons for 2017) is domesti-
cally apportioned to the recreational Angling category by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Highly
Migratory Species (HMS) Management Division (NMFS
2006; NOAA 2017). This subquota is further divided
among Bluefin Tuna size-classes and between the northern
and southern regions of the U.S. East Coast, divided at
39°180N latitude (Great Egg Inlet, New Jersey) in order to
maintain equity in Bluefin Tuna access and landings along
the coast (NOAA 2001).
The HMS Management Division uses a combination of
permitting, size and bag limits, and monitoring to keep
recreational Bluefin Tuna landings within the Angling cate-
gory subquota. To recreationally target and harvest Bluefin
Tuna and other highly migratory species (e.g., billfishes,
sharks, Swordfish Xiphias gladius, and tunas), private vessel
owners must obtain an annual Atlantic HMS Angling per-
mit (NOAA 2002); as of December 31, 2015, there were
12,745 such permits issued for vessels with principal ports
from Maine to North Carolina (B. McHale, NMFS, per-
sonal communication). Bluefin Tuna harvest is regulated on
a trip level using size and bag limits, which the HMS Man-
agement Division reserves the right to adjust over the course
of a season in order to maximize utilization of the Angling
subquota and prevent overages (NOAA 2006). For exam-
ple, in 2017 Angling permit holders were permitted to retain
two school-size Bluefin Tuna (from 69 to <119 cm curved
FL [CFL]) per vessel per day, one large school (from 119 to
<150 cm CFL) or small medium-size (from 150 to <185 cm
CFL) Bluefin Tuna per vessel per day, and one large med-
ium (from 185 to <206 cm CFL) or giant-size (≥206 cm
CFL) Bluefin Tuna per vessel per year (i.e., an annual tro-
phy) (NOAA 2017). To monitor recreational Bluefin Tuna
catch and effort, NMFS administers the Large Pelagics Sur-
vey (LPS) from Maine to Virginia from June through Octo-
ber (Foster et al. 2008). In addition, the HMS Management
Division requires Angling permit holders to report any
recreational Bluefin Tuna landings or dead discards within
24 h of the end of the trip through the Automated Landings
Reporting System (ALRS), accessed via telephone, internet,
or smartphone (NOAA 2014b, 2017). Reporting via the
ALRS is not required in Maryland and North Carolina,
where catch-card programs exist (NMFS 2013).
Despite these strategies, managing recreational Bluefin
Tuna harvest has proven challenging due to interannual
variability in fish availability, limited predictability of
angler effort, and difficulties in accurate monitoring of
recreational landings. Estimates from the LPS become
available in waves, typically a month (or longer) after the
end of each wave. This lag in data availability limits the
ability of the HMS Management Division to monitor the
Angling category fishery in real-time to inform inseason
management adjustments, which could compromise the
ability to prevent landings overages for the Angling sub-
quota (NMFS 2013; S. McLaughlin, NMFS, personal
communication). In addition, the extremely low compli-
ance of permit holders with the ALRS reporting require-
ment (10–20%) has impeded its effectiveness as a real-time
monitoring tool (NMFS 2013) (although the 2017 intro-
duction of a smartphone reporting application [app] may
improve compliance). As a result, significant subquota
overages can occur. In 2009, for example, recreational
anglers landed an estimated 566 metric tons of Bluefin
Tuna—nearly three times the subquota—due to the
increased availability of small medium-size Bluefin Tuna
resulting from particularly strong recruitment in 2003
(NMFS 2013; ICCAT 2017). This overage occurred even
though the daily retention limit for this size-class in 2009
never exceeded one fish per vessel per day (NOAA 2009).
Harvest of small medium-size Bluefin Tuna was subse-
quently prohibited for the majority of the 2010 and 2011
fishing seasons (NOAA 2010, 2011; NMFS 2013).
Little attention has been given to how Bluefin Tuna
availability, regulations, and other factors (e.g., costs)
affect angler effort and fishing behavior. A better under-
standing of these human dimensions would decrease the
likelihood of overages as the behavioral response to shift-
ing resource conditions could be anticipated and incorpo-
rated by managers. In addition, while the economic
impacts of fisheries for Bluefin Tuna and other highly
migratory species have been examined (e.g., Bohnsack
et al. 2002; Hutt et al. 2014), the lack of understanding of
individual angler preferences and values limits the ability
of the HMS Management Division to maximize the fish-
ery’s socioeconomic benefits and thus achieve optimum
yield, as is required by the first National Standard of the
Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act (U.S. Office of the Federal Register 2003).
Few studies have examined the factors influencing the
behavior and decision making of recreational Bluefin
Tuna anglers. This lack of information limits the ability of
managers to anticipate shifts in fishing pressure or appro-
priately balance conservation measures with socioeco-
nomic objectives. Stoll and Ditton (2006) used a
contingent valuation approach to evaluate annual willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for different management scenarios
among recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers in the largely
catch-and-release fishery at Hatteras, North Carolina.
Those authors found, not surprisingly, that WTP was low-
est in the least-flexible, catch-and-release-only regulatory
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scenario. The scope of this study was fairly limited, how-
ever, and considered the effect of only one attribute, har-
vest limit, on angler WTP in a single fishing location.
Acknowledging a degree of complexity, Sutton and Ditton
(2001) found that catch-and-release behavior in the Hat-
teras Bluefin Tuna fishery varied according to angler pref-
erences and lifestyle, and additionally suggested that
situational variables, such as fish size, may be important
in Bluefin Tuna recreational angler decision making.
The purposes of this study were twofold. First, we aimed
to improve the capacity of managers for predicting private
recreational Bluefin Tuna fishing effort and harvest by eval-
uating the decision making and preferences of anglers. Sec-
ond, we endeavored to identify the magnitude and sources
of economic welfare derived from the fishery by anglers in
order to inform management strategies that maximize
angler benefits while maintaining landings within biologi-
cally acceptable limits. In addition, we examined the poten-
tial sources of heterogeneity acting on decision making and
the derived value of the fishery by Bluefin Tuna anglers.
METHODS
We surveyed private recreational anglers permitted to
target Atlantic Bluefin Tuna along the U.S. East Coast
from Maine to North Carolina during the spring and early
summer of 2016. The survey consisted of two main parts:
(1) a sequence of stated-choice questions regarding hypo-
thetical fishing trips to investigate decision making, prefer-
ences, and tradeoffs, and to identify individual angler
benefits; and (2) a series of direct questions regarding
angling behavior, attitudes, and demographics.
Survey design and delivery.— In stated-choice surveys,
individuals are presented with hypothetical, multi-attribute
alternatives (i.e., fishing trips) and asked to rank or choose
their most preferred. Responses can be used to analyze deci-
sion making, identify tradeoffs, and evaluate preferences—
tasks otherwise difficult or impossible for nonmarket goods
(Hanley et al. 1998; Louviere et al. 2000; Freeman 2003).
As the angling experience is, in many instances, a nonmar-
ket good, these methods have found frequent use in analyses
that seek to identify value and understand behavior in recre-
ational fisheries. Typically, these studies evaluate prefer-
ences and policy options by offering respondents choice
alternatives consisting of regulatory variables (e.g., size and
bag limits, seasons), catch characteristics and fishery out-
comes (e.g., size and number of fish caught), and, in many
cases, cost (Aas et al. 2000; Oh et al. 2005; Carter and Liese
2012; Lew and Larson 2012). Respondent decisions can be
used to quantify, for example, angler WTP for kept versus
released fish (Carter and Liese 2012), distinct values that
may be confounded using other, simpler methods.
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs), a type of stated-
choice survey in which respondents are asked to select
their most preferred alternative, were used in this study.
Regulatory and nonregulatory attributes and attribute
levels for DCEs that covered a realistic range of harvest
regulations, fishery outcomes, and costs were determined
in consultation with HMS Management Division staff and
recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers. Given the complex reg-
ulatory nature of the fishery (multiple size-classes, each
with its own harvest limits) and our interest in noncon-
sumptive aspects of Bluefin Tuna fishing (such as hooking
and losing fish), a total of eight attributes were identified
for this study: three regulatory attributes, four catch-
related attributes, and a trip cost attribute (Table 1). Prior
to survey implementation, focus groups with HMS
Angling category permit holders were held in Hyannis,
Massachusetts, and Toms River, New Jersey, in January
and February 2016, respectively, to review draft survey
materials and provide feedback regarding attributes and
levels and the overall clarity of the questionnaire.
Discrete choice experiments frequently consist of two
multi-attribute alternatives as well as a third “opt-out” or,
in this case, “no trip” alternative (Hanley et al. 1998; Car-
ter and Liese 2012). Respondents were asked to imagine
that they could take one of two hypothetical Bluefin Tuna
fishing trips described or not go Bluefin Tuna fishing at all,
and to select the options that they preferred most and least,
allowing for a full ranking of the three alternatives (Lew
and Larson 2012). Following Carter and Liese (2012),
DCEs also included a “derived” attribute, “Legal Harvest,”
which clarified to respondents the quantity of Bluefin Tuna
of each size-class they were legally allowed to retain based
on the quantity and size of fish caught and stated bag lim-
its. Additional definition boxes on the survey pages con-
taining DCEs further clarified the meaning of each
component of the choice task (Figure 1). Macros in SAS
software (SAS 9.3; SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina),
TABLE 1. Attributes and attribute levels included in DCEs presented to
recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers.
Attribute
Number of levels
(values)
Daily bag limit: school 4 (0, 1, 2, 3)
Daily bag limit: large
school/small medium
4 (0, 1, 2, 3)
Annual bag limit: large
medium/giant
2 (0, 1)
Catch: school 3 (0, 1, 2)
Catch: large school/small
medium
3 (0, 1, 2)
Catch: large medium/giant 3 (0, 1, 2)
Number of fish hooked
and lost
3 (0, 1, 2)
Individual trip cost 3 ($200, $400, $600)
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as described by Kuhfeld (2010), were used to develop an
experimental design that maximized balance and orthogo-
nality. We utilized a fractional factorial experimental
design, in which a subset of the full factorial design (choice
sets that include all possible combinations of attribute
levels) is selected such that the effects of interest may be
efficiently estimated (Louviere et al. 2000). Drawing on 144
choice alternatives, our final experimental design included
32 choice sets blocked into eight blocks of four choice sets
each, a number assumed to not be cognitively burdensome
and used in previous stated-choice studies of recreational
anglers (Carson et al. 1994; Hanley et al. 1998; Aas et al.
2000; Hicks 2002). In addition to the four DCEs, each sur-
vey included general questions to understand how angler
preferences and motivations corresponded to behavior and
values as well as to address HMS Management Division
interests. Questions were asked regarding demographics,
primary target species, Bluefin Tuna fishing behavior and
experience level, and Bluefin Tuna fishing and management
preferences and attitudes.
The survey research firm QuanTech, Inc. (Rockville,
Maryland), which holds a continuing agreement with
NMFS to handle confidential HMS Angling permit holder
information, was responsible for survey implementation
FIGURE 1. Sample DCE presented to recreational U.S. East Coast Atlantic Bluefin Tuna anglers. Since the fishery is managed using English units
rather than metric units, curved fork lengths were provided in inches.
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and data collection. A stratified random sample was drawn
from individuals who possessed an Angling category permit
as of December 31, 2015, with a listed primary port from
Maine to North Carolina (from north to south: Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
and North Carolina). Approximately 20% of Angling per-
mit holders were selected from each state, for a total sample
size of 2,600. Within each state, selected permit holders
were randomly assigned one of the eight survey versions
(blocks), with roughly an equal number of each survey ver-
sion distributed in each state. We elected to use a mail sur-
vey since response rates for mail surveys tend to be higher
than or equal to those for internet surveys (Manfreda et al.
2008; Shih and Fan 2008; Olsen 2009), and because a
mixed-mode (mail and internet) economic impact survey of
HMS Angling permit holders from Maine to North Caro-
lina by Hutt et al. (2014) received nearly twice as many
responses via mail. Survey delivery occurred during April–
June 2016 and followed a modified Dillman approach (Dill-
man et al. 2009), which consisted of up to four mailings: a
prenotification letter, initial survey package, reminder post-
card, and second questionnaire. To maximize response
rates, permit holders who completed the survey were
entered into a random drawing to win one of two US$500
cash prizes, and the prenotification mailing included a
sticker in the shape of a Bluefin Tuna that featured the Vir-
ginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) logo.
Model estimation.— Stated-choice modeling is based on
random utility theory, which assumes that an individual
makes decisions in a way that integrates information
across choice alternatives in order to maximize an under-
lying utility function (Louviere and Timmermans 1990).
The probability of selecting a given choice alternative can
be formulated as a function of the attributes in that alter-
native, the attributes in the other alternatives in the choice
set, and the attributes of the individual in combination
with alternative-specific attributes (Train 2009). In the
most straightforward random utility model, the condi-
tional logit, the probability that individual n selects alter-
native i can be written as
Pni ¼ e
bxniP
j e
bxnj
; (1)
where x is a vector of the attributes, b is a vector of
parameters that reflect the utility of those attributes, and
the denominator sums over all alternatives in the choice
set, indexed here by j.
Many stated-choice studies of recreational anglers
have used an extension of the conditional logit model
known as the random parameters (or mixed) logit (e.g.,
Lew and Larson 2012), which allows for random taste
variation, correlation in unobserved factors influencing
utility (i.e., errors) across choices, and unrestricted substi-
tution patterns (Train 2009). In these models, coefficients
for parameters of interest vary across individuals, allow-
ing researchers to investigate heterogeneity in preferences.
While the random parameters logit is a powerful tool
for identifying heterogeneity, it is less effective in explain-
ing the sources of heterogeneity among respondents (Boxall
and Adamowicz 2002). Because a primary goal of this
study was to parse out differences among Bluefin Tuna
anglers that might be applicable for management purposes
(i.e., to identify discrete subpopulations of anglers) (Pro-
vencher et al. 2002), we elected to use a specialized form of
the random parameters logit known as the latent class (or
finite mixture) logit model. The underlying theory of the
latent class model is that an individual’s choice behavior is
affected not only by observable attributes present in the
choice sets but also by unobserved (or latent) preference
heterogeneity (Greene and Hensher 2003). In the latent
class model, each of the b parameters takes M possible val-
ues corresponding to M classes, or segments, in the popu-
lation, with each class having its own distinct preferences.
The model jointly estimates class membership (based on
individual characteristics) and class-specific choice proba-
bilities (based on class-specific utility parameters). In the
latent class model, the probability of individual n choosing
alternative i becomes
Pni ¼
XM
m¼1 Snm
ebmxniP
j e
bmxnj
 !
; (2)
where bm refers to the utility parameters for each class m,
and Snm, also called the classification function, refers to the
probability that individual n belongs to class m (Train
2009). The latent class model has been successfully used
with stated preference data to identify discrete population
classes in several environmental applications, including
wilderness park choice (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002), mar-
ine protected area preferences (Wallmo and Edwards 2008),
and freshwater recreational angler preferences (Provencher
et al. 2002; Morey et al. 2006). Such an approach requires
the researcher to hypothesize the number of discrete classes
into which the population separates (Boxall and Adamow-
icz 2002). One notable benefit of this method is that the
researcher is not forced to assume an individual’s (un-
known) class membership; instead, a class probability can
be assigned for each individual (Morey et al. 2006).
Following Lew and Larson (2012), we extended the
latent class model to account for (1) the full ranking of
choice alternatives, obtained by asking respondents to
select their most and least preferred alternatives, and (2)
the panel nature of the data (each respondent answered
up to four DCEs). Using the full rank ordering of
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alternatives, as opposed to simply the most preferred alter-
native, increases the number of choice observations
obtained for each respondent, thereby reducing the vari-
ances of parameter estimates (Chapman and Staelin 1982).
Given that our choice sets had three options, the probabil-
ity that an individual in class m chooses alternative i as
most preferred and alternative k as least preferred (Pr
[i > j > k]) corresponds to the probability of choosing
alternative i as best among the three alternatives (Pr [i| i,
j, k]) multiplied by the probability of choosing alternative
j as best among the remaining two alternatives (Pr [j| j,
k]). Given the hypothesized number of classes and the
assumption of independently and identically Gumbel-dis-
tributed random error terms, the probability of individual
n choosing alternative i is
Pni ¼
XM
m¼1
ekmZnPM
m¼1 ekmZn
 !
ebmXi
ebmXi þ ebmXj þ ebmXk
 
ebmXj
ebmXj þ ebmXk
  
: (3)
Here, Snm has been further specified to be a function
of Zn, representing a vector of individual-specific charac-
teristics hypothesized to affect class membership, and km,
the vector of parameters corresponding to those individ-
ual traits, with parameters for one class set to a value of
0 as the base case (modified from Boxall and Adamowicz
2002). Assuming independence of choices (and error
terms) across the choice sets, the probability that a per-
son makes a given sequence of choices across multiple
choice sets becomes the product of individual choice
probabilities for that sequence, resulting in the following
log-likelihood:
lnL¼
XN
n¼1 ln
XM
m¼1
ekmZnPM
m¼1ekmZn
 ! 
YT
t¼1
ebmXit
ebmXitþebmXjtþebmXkt
 
ebmXjt
ebmXjtþ ebmXkt
   !
;
(4)
where t represents each of up to four choice sets answered
by each respondent.
The utility of a given trip alternative (and thus the
probability of selecting that trip) for members of a given
class was assumed to be a linear function of the 11 attri-
butes that characterized each trip, while an alternative-spe-
cific constant (ASC) was used to represent the utility of
not going Bluefin Tuna fishing (option C), as has been
done in previous choice experiments for recreational fish-
eries (e.g., Carter and Liese 2012; Duffield et al. 2012;
Lew and Larson 2012). The probability of class member-
ship, meanwhile, was assumed to be a function of
individual-specific variables, including those relating to
fishing behavior (e.g, avidity, target species), attitudes
(e.g., consumptive orientation), and demographics (e.g.,
region, income).
Model fit for varying numbers of classes (1 [conditional
logit], 2, 3, 4, and 5) and differing vectors of individual
parameters was assessed using Akaike’s information crite-
rion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
following previous studies (e.g., Boxall and Adamowicz
2002; Wallmo and Edwards 2008). Hypotheses regarding
which individual parameters to include were informed by
focus group discussions and by answers to non-DCE
questions in the surveys (see Appendix). One hundred
model runs were conducted for each model using the
high-performance computing cluster at VIMS to ensure
model convergence, which was assessed by the stability of
the model’s negative log-likelihood over model runs. The
AIC and BIC were also used to compare latent class
model fit with the standard conditional logit model. All
model estimation was performed using the nonlinear mini-
mization function (nlm) in the statistical programming
software R (R Core Team 2016).
Model analysis.— Following the selection of the final
model and the identification of discrete classes, the proba-
bility of an individual’s membership in each class was cal-
culated based on the classification function. This prior
probability was then adjusted to account for the sequence
of choices actually made by that individual, resulting in a
posterior probability of class membership (see Greene
2008). To estimate the marginal effect of individual char-
acteristics on the posterior probability of class member-
ship for each individual n, the log-odds of membership in
class m were regressed against the vector of individual
characteristics Z (Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Boxall and
Adamowicz 1999):
ln
Pnm
1 Pnm
 
¼ bmZn þ enm;m ¼ 1; . . .;M: (5)
The marginal effect of each variable on class member-
ship was then calculated by estimating the class member-
ship probability for dummy variable values of 0 and 1 (all
individual factors in Zn were included as dummy vari-
ables) while holding other variables constant at the overall
respondent average. Additionally, we assigned individuals
to a class based on their highest posterior class probability
(Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Boxall and Adamowicz 1999)
and then used a combination of Student’s t-tests (for con-
tinuous, normally distributed data), permutation tests (for
heavily skewed data), and Fisher exact tests (for categori-
cal data) to test for significant differences in individual-
specific variables among classes.
Willingness to pay refers to the monetary compensa-
tion needed by an individual so that utility remains
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unchanged when a choice attribute level is changed. To
calculate WTP for each class m for various aspects of a
Bluefin Tuna fishing trip, the parameter corresponding to
the attribute of interest a was divided by the negative of
the cost parameter c:
WTPma ¼  bmabmc
;m ¼ 1; . . .;M: (6)
To calculate several measures of angler welfare and
preferences, including marginal effects of attribute changes
on trip probability, compensating surplus of regulatory
changes, and consumer surplus, it was necessary to esti-
mate attribute levels for an “average” recreational Bluefin
Tuna fishing trip on the U.S. East Coast during 2015 (the
most recent complete fishing year prior to survey delivery)
(Table 2). Estimates of the numbers of school, large
school, and small medium-size Bluefin Tuna harvested
and released, as well as the number of large medium and
giant-size Bluefin Tuna released, from Maine to Virginia
during June–October 2015 were obtained through an
online LPS query (NMFS Fisheries Statistics Division,
personal communication). An estimate of the number of
large medium and giant-size Bluefin Tuna retained by
Angling category permit holders from Maine to Virginia
during 2015 (not available through an LPS query) was
obtained through a data request to the HMS Management
Division (S. McLaughlin, NMFS, personal communica-
tion). Total Bluefin Tuna fishing effort by private anglers
from Maine to Virginia during June–October 2015,
obtained through an LPS data request, was estimated to
be 16,367 vessel trips (R. Kitts-Jensen, NMFS, personal
communication); harvest and release estimates for the dif-
ferent Bluefin Tuna size-classes were divided by the effort
estimate to calculate per-trip values. Because the LPS only
occurs for 6 months out of the year and does not include
North Carolina, average catch and effort values used here
do not fully capture the U.S. East Coast Bluefin Tuna
fishery but constitute the best available data and were
deemed adequate for estimating catch and effort on the
average trip. Focus-group attendees suggested that
roughly one-third of Bluefin Tuna hooked are lost before
being caught, an estimate used to derive the average num-
ber of fish hooked and lost per trip. Lastly, we used Hutt
et al.’s (2014) estimate of per Angling permit holder trip
expenditures for HMS Angling category permit holders
targeting Atlantic tunas in 2011 from Maine to North
Carolina ($534) as an average Bluefin Tuna trip expendi-
ture value.
Class-specific WTP for the average trip was calculated
by taking the sum of the products of 2015 average attri-
bute levels X (excluding cost) and their corresponding
parameters b, subtracting the value of the ASC, and divid-
ing by the negative of the cost parameter:
WTPm2015 ¼ 
PA
a¼1 bmaX2015
 	
 bmNoTrip
bmc
;m ¼ 1; . . .;M:
(7)
A weighted average WTP for the entire sample was esti-
mated by summing the product of class-specific WTP and the
probability of class membership across all classes (Domanski
and Haefen 2010). In addition, the marginal effect of each
trip attribute on the class-specific probability of taking a
Bluefin Tuna fishing trip was determined by calculating each
class’s logit probability while holding attributes at the 2015
average levels but varying the attribute level of interest from
0 to 1 (with the exception of cost, which was changed by
$100); the difference in probabilities then represented the
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in attribute a.
To determine the effect of possible management
changes on the welfare of private recreational Bluefin
Tuna anglers, we estimated class-specific compensating
surplus under relevant plausible regulatory scenarios
(Hanemann 1984; Hoyos 2010):
Compensating surplusm
¼  1
bmc
ln
X
ebmaX1
 	
 ln
X
ebmaX0
 	h i
; (8)
where X0 and X1 represent the vector of trip attributes at
the status quo (2015 average trip) and after management
changes, respectively. Welfare impacts were examined for
the following management changes: no harvest of large
TABLE 2. Attribute levels for the “average” 2015 recreational Bluefin
Tuna trip taken along the U.S. East Coast. Note: while some large
medium/giant-size Bluefin Tuna were undoubtedly released by recre-
ational anglers during 2015, the large pelagics survey (LPS) did not
intercept any anglers who did so (which is not surprising given that
such an event is relatively rare). As a result, while recognizing that
this estimate is lower than the actual value, we included the LPS esti-
mate of 0 here.
Bluefin Tuna trip characteristics
2015 average
trip
Daily bag limit: school 2
Daily bag limit: large school/small medium 1
Annual bag limit: large medium/giant 1
Released: school 0.07
Released: large school/small medium 0.07
Released: large medium/giant 0
Harvested: school 0.06
Harvested: large school/small medium 0.06
Harvested: large medium/giant 0.001
Number of fish hooked and lost 0.06
Individual trip cost $534
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medium or giant-size Bluefin Tuna; no harvest of any
Bluefin Tuna; and complete closure of the fishery (i.e., no
permitted targeting of Bluefin Tuna).
Consumer surplus for each class for 2015 was estimated
by multiplying class-specific consumer surplus per trip by
the estimated number of Bluefin Tuna trips taken by that
class in 2015. The estimated number of trips for members
of each class was calculated by multiplying the total num-
ber of Bluefin Tuna trips taken in 2015 by the proportion
of all active Bluefin Tuna fishers who were posteriorly
assigned to that class (i.e., respondents who indicated hav-
ing targeted Bluefin Tuna in the previous 5 years). Sum-
ming these class-specific estimates provided a consumer
surplus estimate for the private recreational Bluefin Tuna
fishery as a whole:
Consumer surplus2015
¼
XM
m¼1 PmActive  TotalTrips2015ð Þ½
WTPm2015  TripCost2015Þð : (9)
Confidence intervals (95%) for welfare measures (WTP,
compensating surplus, and consumer surplus) and marginal
effects were generated using the resampling method sug-
gested by Krinsky and Robb (1986), based on 10,000 ran-
dom draws of class-specific vectors of utility parameters
from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean and
covariance matrix set to model estimates. Each draw was
used to calculate one estimate for the measure of interest
(welfare or marginal effect); following all calculations, the
distribution for that measure was evaluated. This approach
to calculating the distribution of welfare impacts has been
used previously with logit models in an environmental valu-
ation context (see Park et al. 1991; Domanski and Haefen
2010; Hoyos 2010; Haab et al. 2012).
RESULTS
Response Rates and Non-DCE Findings
Of the 2,485 eligible respondents in the sample frame,
1,154 (46.4%) returned the survey having answered at least
one question, while 980 (39.4%) completed at least one
DCE (Table 3). The proportion of respondents from each
state who completed at least one DCE did not differ sig-
nificantly from the proportion of the total sample from
each state (P > 0.05), suggesting a lack of geographic
response bias. Preliminary analysis of non-DCE survey
questions suggested regional segmentation and led to the
inclusion of regional dummy variables in modeling efforts,
along with other demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral
variables (see Appendix for a summary of responses to
non-DCE questions).
The Latent Class Model
Final model specification.—While latent class models
with two, three, four, and five classes were attempted, con-
vergence was only achieved for the two-class, 31-para-
meter model (Table 4): 20 of 100 model runs had a
negative log-likelihood of between 4,857 and 4,858, while
all models with larger class structures failed to converge
to a stable negative log-likelihood. The three-class model,
while not fully converging, appeared to separate one of
the two classes in the two-class model into two separate
classes rather than identifying three novel classes, lending
support to the two-class model. Model selection criteria
indicated that the two-class model provided a markedly
better fit to the data than did the conditional logit model
(ΔAIC = 1,728.9).
Parameter estimates for the final two-class model are
listed in Table 5. Of the two-class models tested (each
with differing individual-specific variables to inform class
membership), the best-fitting model included the 12 alter-
native-specific attributes and six individual-specific
dummy variables. Consumptive and nonconsumptive ori-
entation dummy variables were generated based on
respondents’ answers to two five-point Likert scale ques-
tions included in the non-DCE portion of the survey.
Respondents who selected “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”
for each of the following two statements were considered
consumptively oriented: “I would never target Bluefin
Tuna if I were not allowed to retain fish” and “Gener-
ally speaking, I would be more satisfied with a Bluefin
Tuna fishing trip if I were able to bring more fish back
to the dock (e.g., I am more satisfied with a trip on
which I retain three Bluefin Tuna than a trip on which I
retain two Bluefin Tuna).” Respondents who selected
“Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” for each of these
statements were considered nonconsumptively oriented.
Dummy variables were also used to identify individuals
with primary ports in either New England or New
York/New Jersey, those who had targeted Bluefin Tuna
in the previous 5 years, and those with an annual
income of over $150,000. The median annual income for
respondents was between $100,000 and $150,000, with
nearly 40% of respondents indicating annual income
greater than $150,000 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
Latent class probabilities were 0.53 and 0.47 for class 1
and class 2, respectively. Of anglers posteriorly assigned
to class 1 (posterior probability > 0.5), 96.4% were
assigned with >80% probability (91.8% with >90% prob-
ability), and 97.1% of anglers posteriorly assigned to
class 2 were assigned with >80% probability (94.3% with
>90% probability).
As expected, coefficients for harvest were positive and
significant for both classes, and coefficients for cost were
negative. The classes differed notably, however, in the
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effect of the catch on utility. Because the model included
both a catch variable and a harvest variable for each Blue-
fin Tuna size-class, catch parameters might be considered
to represent the utility of catching and releasing a Bluefin
Tuna (i.e., the model parameter identified the effect of an
increase in catch independent of changes in harvest).
Catch and release of Bluefin Tuna generally increased util-
ity (and thus probability of trip choice) for class 1, but
had the opposite effect on class 2 for large school/small
medium and large medium/giant-size Bluefin Tuna. In
addition, the no-trip ASC for class 1 was negative and sig-
nificant, indicating a preference for Bluefin Tuna fishing
regardless of trip characteristics. This result reflects the
fact that all 523 respondents assigned to class 1 selected
the no-trip option as their least-preferred option for at
least one DCE, compared with only 24.3% of class 2
respondents. These differences resulted in a significantly
higher probability of taking a Bluefin Tuna trip at average
2015 levels for class 1 (0.95) than for class 2 (0.27) and in
varying (often opposite) marginal effects of attribute
changes on trip probability—that is, how a marginal
change in a trip attribute (e,g., increasing school-size Blue-
fin Tuna harvest from 0 to 1) would change the probabil-
ity of an individual taking a Bluefin Tuna trip given their
class membership (Table 6).
Latent class characterization.— Income and Bluefin
Tuna targeting were the only two individual-specific vari-
ables to significantly influence class membership (Table 5).
The multiple linear regression on the log-odds of class
membership as a function of the individual-specific param-
eters revealed that individuals who had an annual income
of over $150,000 and who had targeted Bluefin Tuna in
the past 5 years were significantly more likely to be in
class 1 (Table 7); an individual possessing both of these
characteristics was 71.4% more likely to be in class 1. The
increase in class 1 probability due to both having high
income and having recently targeted Bluefin Tuna is not
simply the sum of the increases in class 1 probability for
each characteristic because the two are weakly correlated
(Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient [rs] was 0.07).
Fisher exact tests indicated that a significantly higher per-
centage of individuals posteriorly assigned to class 1 had
targeted Bluefin Tuna in the past 5 years and had an
annual income of over $150,000 compared with those in
class 2, while New England or New York/New Jersey resi-
dency and consumptive orientation were not significantly
different between classes (Table A.2). Interestingly, a sig-
nificantly higher percentage of permit holders posteriorly
assigned to class 2 were from mid-Atlantic states, possibly
due to the reduced proportion of mid-Atlantic permit
holders who had recently targeted Bluefin Tuna compared
with anglers from other regions (see Table A.1).
Angler Welfare
The WTP values show striking differences in prefer-
ences among the two classes (Table 8). Class 1 members
TABLE 3. Sample frame and responses by state.
State Permit holders Eligible respondents Number of responses Response rate (%)
Maine 425 82 40 48.8
New Hampshire 186 38 8 21.1
Massachusetts 2,470 483 188 38.9
Rhode Island 539 107 41 38.3
Connecticut 574 115 56 48.7
New York 1,822 327 110 33.6
New Jersey 2,713 538 224 41.6
Delaware 750 149 69 46.3
Maryland 1,044 208 72 34.6
Virginia 908 180 71 39.4
North Carolina 1,314 258 101 39.1
Total 12,745 2,485 980 39.4
TABLE 4. Models fitted to angler DCE responses; CL refers to conditional logit, LCM refers to latent class model, and DNC indicates that a model
failed to converge to a stable negative log-likelihood.
Model Number of parameters Log-likelihood AIC BIC
CL 12 5,740.48 11,504.96 11,579.75
Two-class LCM 31 4,857.03 9,776.06 9,927.58
LCM with > two classes 31 + 19 9 M DNC DNC DNC
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exhibited positive WTP for catching and releasing Bluefin
Tuna of all size-classes, while class 2 members were indif-
ferent to catching and releasing school-size fish and actu-
ally indicated a negative WTP for catching and releasing
larger size-classes, meaning that these individuals lose util-
ity by practicing catch-and-release fishing (and would have
to be paid in order to do so). Class 1 members exhibited a
WTP of $1,438 for the no-trip ASC—in other words,
these individuals would have to be paid over $1,400 to
not go on a Bluefin Tuna fishing trip—indicating the value
placed on simply going Bluefin Tuna fishing, regardless of
trip outcomes. For class 2 members, however, WTP for
the no-trip ASC was not different from 0, indicating their
indifference to a Bluefin Tuna trip independent of trip
attributes (namely, harvest). Despite these contrasts in
nonconsumptive preferences, WTP for harvest did not
vary significantly between classes—that is, 95% CIs associ-
ated with WTP for harvest of each Bluefin Tuna size-class
overlapped between the two classes. For the average 2015
trip WTP differed significantly between class 1 ($2,218.72)
and class 2 ($49.90), with an overall weighted average
WTP of $1,285.11 (Figure 2). Interestingly, for class 2
members, who were significantly less likely to have taken
a Bluefin Tuna trip in the previous 5 years, WTP for the
average 2015 trip ($49.90) was much less than the average
estimated cost per Angling permit holder for a 2015 Blue-
fin Tuna trip ($534); this can be attributed to the low har-
vest levels associated with the average trip in 2015.
Consumer surplus for the 2015 recreational Bluefin Tuna
fishery as a whole, weighted by class (based on survey
responses, 61.8% of active Bluefin Tuna fishers were esti-
mated to be in class 1 and 38.2% in class 2), was estimated
TABLE 5. Parameter estimates for two-class latent class logit model fit
to DCE data. A single asterisk (*) denotes significance at P = 0.05; a
double asterisk (**) denotes significance at P = 0.01. LS/SM = large
school/small medium, LM/G = large medium/giant.
Variables
Class 1 Class 2
b SE b SE
X variables
Daily bag: S 0.292** 0.080 0.0950 0.058
Daily bag:
LS/SM
0.208** 0.065 0.051 0.053
Annual bag:
LM/G
0.518** 0.119 0.140 0.095
Catch: S 0.230** 0.078 0.092 0.059
Catch: LS/SM 0.197** 0.071 0.202** 0.059
Catch: LM/G 0.122* 0.058 0.121* 0.048
Legal harvest: S 0.296** 0.107 0.342** 0.078
Legal harvest:
LS/SM
0.621** 0.087 0.754** 0.077
Legal harvest:
LM/G
0.581** 0.129 0.602** 0.110
Hooked and lost 0.219** 0.040 0.056 0.036
Trip cost 0.002** 0.0003 0.002** 0.0002
No-trip ASC 2.647** 0.271 0.223 0.186
Z variables
Consumptive 0 0.014 0.203
Nonconsumptive 0 0.195 0.208
High income 0 0.363* 0.147
New England 0 0.086 0.178
New York/New
Jersey
0 0.131 0.175
Target Bluefin
Tuna
0 0.964** 0.195
Intercept 0 0.783** 0.154
Latent class
probability
0.528 0.472
TABLE 6. Marginal effects of a one-unit change in trip attribute levels
on trip probability, given 2015 average Bluefin Tuna trip levels; S refers
to school-size fish LS/SM refers to large school/small medium-size fish,
LM/G refers to large medium/giant-size fish, and CR refers to catch and
release. A single asterisk (*) denotes a marginal probability statistically
significant at a 95% confidence level based on 10,000 draws of the
parameter vector; bold text denotes a significant difference in marginal
probability between classes.
Factor Class 1 Class 2
2015 average trip probability 0.955* 0.266*
Marginal effects
CR, 1 S 0.009* 0.018
CR, 1 LS/SM 0.008* 0.037*
CR, 1 LM/G 0.005* 0.023*
Harvest, 1 S 0.019* 0.092*
Harvest, 1 LS/SM 0.026* 0.118*
Harvest, 1 LM/G 0.023* 0.103*
Hook and lose 1 fish 0.009* 0.011
$100 increase in trip cost 0.009* 0.039*
TABLE 7. Output of multiple linear regression of the log-odds of poste-
rior class 2 membership as a function of Z parameters. A single asterisk
(*) denotes significance at P = 0.05; a double asterisk (**) denotes
significance at P = 0.01. Adjusted R2 = 0.1116. F-statistic = 21.5 (P =
2.2 9 1016).
Variable Estimate
Marginal effect of
class 2 probability
Intercept 6.9088**
Consumptive 0.1075
Nonconsumptive 0.3626
High income 1.7015** 0.218
New England 0.1963
New York/New Jersey 0.5864
Target Bluefin Tuna 5.7609** 0.446
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to be $14.01 million (SD = $3.99 million), reflecting the dif-
ference between aggregate WTP for 16,367 average 2015
Bluefin Tuna vessel trips ($22.75 million) and aggregate esti-
mated 2015 Bluefin Tuna trip expenditures ($8.74 million).
Using Angling category landings for Bluefin Tuna in 2015
(113.1 metric tons; HMS Management Division, unpub-
lished data) and the estimated proportion of landings taken
by Angling category permit holders (69.4%) as opposed to
HMS Charter/Headboat permit holders (NMFS, Fisheries
Statistics Division, personal communication), private-angler
Bluefin Tuna landings in 2015 were estimated to be 78.5
metric tons, resulting in a consumer surplus of $80.98 per
pound ($178.16/kg) of harvest. This high marginal WTP for
harvest reflects the fact that for class 1 anglers, who repre-
sent over half of active Bluefin Tuna anglers, significant sur-
plus is derived not just from harvest but from the
nonconsumptive aspects of Bluefin Tuna fishing as well.
Class-specific estimates of angler-compensating surplus
largely reflect the stark difference in preferences between
classes (Table 9). For example, a complete fishery closure
would result in a loss of over $1,700 in welfare per trip
for class 1 anglers, a result of the significant benefits that
class 1 anglers derive from the fishery from aspects other
than harvest (whose 2015 levels were relatively low). How-
ever, for class 2 anglers, a fishery closure would only gen-
erate a per-trip welfare loss of about $150 given the
already low harvest levels (and thus low class 2 WTP)
associated with the 2015 average trip.
DISCUSSION
Drivers of Class Membership
Our results clearly demonstrate a segmentation in pref-
erences among Bluefin Tuna anglers along the U.S. East
Coast, indicating substantial heterogeneity in derived wel-
fare among anglers while also providing key insights into
how changes to regulations and fishery conditions (e.g.,
costs, fish distribution) could impact effort and harvest.
Preference heterogeneity appears to largely be driven by
income and recent (within the past 5 years) targeting of
Bluefin Tuna (or lack thereof), both of which are logical
in the context of the fishery. Regulations governing recre-
ational Bluefin Tuna harvest have generally been strict
since the mid-2000s, only allowing one to three fish per
vessel per day (NOAA 2012, 2014a); as a result, individu-
als who highly value harvest but not catch-and-release
fishing (i.e., class 2 members) have perhaps not been com-
pelled to target Bluefin Tuna in recent years—as evidenced
by the 0.27 probability of taking a trip with 2015 average
trip levels for class 2 members (see Table 6). This idea
was reinforced during presurvey focus groups, when some
anglers mentioned targeting Bluefin Tuna heavily when
regulations were liberal in the early 2000s (e.g., in 2003,
when vessels could retain one school, large school, or
small medium-size Bluefin Tuna per person, or up to six
per vessel, per day [NOAA 2003]), but subsequently
switching to other species with less restrictive harvest lim-
its when Bluefin Tuna bag limits were reduced. For lower-
income anglers, meanwhile, it may not be feasible or
TABLE 8. Class-specific WTP for Bluefin Tuna trip attributes. A single
asterisk (*) denotes a WTP significantly different from 0 at a 95% confi-
dence level based on 10,000 draws of the parameter vector; bold text
denotes a significant difference in WTP between classes. LS/SM = large
school/small medium, LM/G = large medium/giant.
Attribute Class 1 Class 2
Catch: S $123.09* $44.11
Catch: LS/SM $104.52* –$97.04*
Catch: LM/G $64.71* –$58.64*
Legal harvest: S $160.20* $162.98*
Legal harvest: LS/SM $338.46* $360.01*
Legal harvest: LM/G $315.33* $288.58*
Hook and lose $118.89* $26.71
No trip (option C) –$1,438.35* $111.50
FIGURE 2. Willingness to pay (WTP) for the average 2015 Bluefin
Tuna trip by class and overall. Diamonds represent the mean values and
vertical dashed lines indicate the 95% Krinsky–Robb CIs based on
10,000 random draws.
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worthwhile to target Bluefin Tuna with any regularity (or
at all) given the high costs of the fishery coupled with rela-
tively restrictive harvest regulations. Among lower-income
anglers (annual income < $150,000) who had not targeted
Bluefin Tuna in the previous 5 years, 34% indicated the
high expense of Bluefin Tuna fishing as a reason for not
recently targeting the species, compared with only 20% for
high-income anglers (P = 0.08).
The finding that anglers with higher levels of income
value catch-and-release fishing more highly is supported
by previous studies of U.S. recreational anglers. In a sur-
vey of freshwater anglers in New York State, Connelly
et al. (2001) used cluster analysis to identify seven types of
anglers; a highly skilled group that targeted coldwater spe-
cies and practiced catch and release had the highest aver-
age income of the seven groups. Grambsch and Fisher
(1991) found that freshwater black bass anglers with an
annual income greater than the U.S. median were signifi-
cantly more likely to practice catch and release than
anglers with incomes below the median. Most notably, in
a study of billfish tournament anglers along the U.S.
Atlantic and Gulf coasts as well as in Puerto Rico, Graefe
and Ditton (1997) found that income was a significant
predictor of whether an angler would release all billfish
(anglers with a higher income were more likely to release
all billfish) and that income was the strongest predictor of
the number of billfish kept (anglers with a lower income
kept more billfish). While Bluefin Tuna are a more
sought-after food fish than billfish, a similar association
with income and catch-and-release angling could presum-
ably hold. In the present study, a Fisher exact test
revealed that a significantly higher proportion of anglers
with an annual income of over $150,000 stated that they
voluntarily release Bluefin Tuna (59%) compared with
anglers with an annual income of less than $150,000
(42%; P = 0.03).
The relatively high value attached to catch-and-release
fishing among higher-income anglers identified both in
previous studies and through some of our questions may
explain the continued avidity of this group despite increas-
ingly restrictive Bluefin Tuna harvest regulations, suggest-
ing there is a relatively inelastic response in effort to
management strategies by class 1 anglers. Interestingly,
our model did not identify significant differences in WTP
for harvest between class 1 and class 2—both groups con-
sidered harvest equally important. However, the additional
value attached by class 1 anglers to nonconsumptive aspects
of Bluefin Tuna fishing (catch and release, hooking and los-
ing fish, and other factors captured by the ASC) appear to
provide sufficient incentive for this group to continue tar-
geting Bluefin Tuna despite restrictive harvest regulations.
Studies using pop-up satellite archival tags have indicated
that postrelease mortality of Bluefin Tuna released in recre-
ational fisheries is low (<5%) across size-classes (Stokesbury
et al. 2011; Marcek and Graves 2014; Goldsmith et al.
2017), suggesting that catch-and-release angling is a viable
conservation strategy that would provide substantial bene-
fits, especially to high-income anglers.
For both angler classes, WTP to harvest a large school
or small medium-size Bluefin Tuna was higher than WTP
to harvest a large medium or giant-size Bluefin Tuna,
although differences in WTP for harvest did not differ sig-
nificantly across size-classes for either angler class. This
counterintuitive finding (higher WTP for harvesting a
smaller fish) could be explained by the fact that in the sur-
vey, as in recent years, vessel bag limits for harvest of
school and large school and small medium-size Bluefin
Tuna were on a per-trip basis, whereas for large medium
and giant-size Bluefin Tuna, vessel bag limits were on a
per-year basis. As a result, if the annual bag limit for large
medium or giant-size Bluefin Tuna is one fish, choosing to
retain a large medium or giant-size Bluefin Tuna would
prevent harvest of similarly sized fish on future trips.
However, retaining a large school or small medium-size
Bluefin Tuna would present no such constraint. A prefer-
ence for both angler classes to harvest larger fish is sug-
gested by higher mean WTP for harvesting a large school
or small medium-size Bluefin Tuna than for a school-size
Bluefin Tuna, both of which have bag limits on a per-trip
basis.
The lack of explanatory power of the consumptive ori-
entation variables included in the class membership model
is possibly because the Likert scale questions used to
define these variables were only asked to individuals who
stated that they had targeted Bluefin Tuna in the previous
5 years, the latter being a dominant determinant of class
membership. However, both the consumptive and noncon-
sumptive orientation dummy variables were highly corre-
lated with having targeted Bluefin Tuna in the previous
5 years (Spearman’s rs was 0.39 and 0.36, respectively),
and only the targeting variable was significant in the
model, suggesting that recent Bluefin Tuna targeting
behavior is likely a stronger driver of class membership.
There are, however, two possible alternative reasons for
the lack of significance of the consumptive orientation fac-
tors: (1) the Likert scale questions used to define
TABLE 9. Class-specific compensating surplus (base case: 2015 levels).
A single asterisk (*) denotes compensating surplus significantly different
from 0 at a 95% confidence level based on 10,000 draws of the parameter
vector; bold text denotes a significant difference in compensating surplus
between classes.
Change from 2015 fishery Class 1 Class 2
No LM–G harvest $268.00* $17.09
Catch-and-release fishing only $675.76* $38.32
Fishery closure $1,708.90* $149.14*
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consumptive orientation may not have adequately cap-
tured angler attitudes; and/or (2) the stated consumptive
attitudes of anglers (in Likert scale questions) may not
have aligned with the preferences expressed in DCE
responses. This latter possibility highlights a key strength
of using DCEs for eliciting preferences; for example, a
respondent may not consider himself consumptively ori-
ented when directly asked (resulting in nonconsumptive
responses to Likert scale questions), but when confronted
with actual trip scenarios, may in fact select trip alterna-
tives that allow greater opportunities for harvest.
WTP Comparisons with Previous Studies
Our class-specific WTP estimates for harvest of a single
Bluefin Tuna, which ranged from $160.20 to $360.01
across size ranges and angler classes, are generally higher
than the marginal WTP for catch of an additional fish
found in Johnston et al.’s (2006) meta-analysis of recre-
ational fishing values obtained for diverse fisheries using
various analytical methods (391 observations from 48
studies between 1977 and 2001), which found WTPs rang-
ing from $0.048 to $612.79, with a mean of $16.82. Spe-
cies in the meta-analysis with higher WTPs (>$100/fish)
generally included popular food and sport fish such as sal-
mon (e.g., Jones and Stokes Associates 1987; Morey et al.
1993) and big-game species such as billfish and sharks
(e.g., Schuhmann 1996 reviewed in Johnston et al. 2006).
In addition, our estimates are similar to Duffield et al.’s
(2012) WTP estimate of $276.44 for catching a Blue Mar-
lin Makaira nigricans among private-boat Hawaiian
anglers (the survey did not distinguish between harvested
and released fish). Given their elite status as both a food
and sport fish, the high WTP estimated for Bluefin Tuna
harvest is not surprising.
Class 1 WTPs for Bluefin Tuna fishing trip characteris-
tics were found to be generally similar to values for other
sport fish for which significant nonharvest benefits are
derived. For example, Duffield et al. (2012) also found
that Hawaiian anglers were willing to pay $166.45 to see
a Blue Marlin and $128.72 to hook and lose a Blue Mar-
lin—60% and 47% of WTP for catch, respectively. The
importance of these nonconsumptive aspects, in terms of
both WTP and relative importance compared with catch,
is similar to class 1 members in the present study, who
demonstrated a WTP of $118.89 for hooking and losing a
Bluefin Tuna—35–74% of WTP for Bluefin Tuna harvest,
depending on size-class. Similarly, in their discrete choice
survey of southeastern U.S. anglers, Carter and Liese
(2012) found WTP for releasing an additional King Mack-
erel Scomberomorus cavalla due to having reached the bag
limit ($37.62) to be nearly half the WTP for King Mack-
erel harvest ($77.59), although this reflects marginal WTP
for the second fish caught rather than the first fish and
thus is a conservative estimate. While the WTP values for
Bluefin Tuna are higher, the relative proportion of WTP
for catch-and-release fishing compared with harvest (21–
77%, depending on size-class) for class 1 is similar to that
shown for King Mackerel. Thus, for class 1 anglers, Blue-
fin Tuna, in addition to being a highly desirable food fish,
are also a valuable game fish that, like Blue Marlin and
King Mackerel, can provide significant benefits even in
the absence of catch and/or harvest.
For class 2 members, harvest is the primary factor driv-
ing choice, and preference for harvest (and aversion to
practicing catch and release) is even stronger than in other
studies for coveted food fish. In the same study that found
relatively high WTP for King Mackerel release compared
with harvest, Carter and Liese (2012) calculated a WTP
for harvesting Red Snapper Lutjanus campechanus and
grouper species ($80.40 and $62.97, respectively) more
than eight times the value of releasing the fish due to bag
limit restrictions ($9.95 and $6.86, respectively). While
both Red Snapper and groupers are considered highly
desirable food species, anglers still placed some value on
catch-and-release fishing, compared with the negative
WTP values exhibited by class 2 Bluefin Tuna anglers in
the present study.
Applications to Management
We found that the recreational Bluefin Tuna fishery
resulted in an aggregate consumer surplus of over $14 mil-
lion for 2015. This estimate reflects the total net benefits
that anglers derived above and beyond trip expenditures—
a recreational analog to profit obtained by a commercial
fishery. Because this consumer surplus estimate does not
include clients on charter fishing vessels targeting Bluefin
Tuna (who presumably derive benefits exceeding charter
costs) and only includes effort captured by the LPS, which
does not fully cover the fishery’s spatial and temporal
range, it is likely conservatively low. Aggregate consumer
surplus estimates for recreational fisheries are generally
scarce in the literature due to the lack of available expen-
diture and valuation information. It is worth noting that
our estimate does carry significant caveats: for example,
(1) the assumption that Bluefin Tuna trips in 2015 cost
roughly the same as all tuna trips (Bluefin Tuna and other
species) along the U.S. East Coast in 2011, and (2) the
fact that the relative proportion of anglers in each class
who had targeted Bluefin Tuna in the past 5 years is
equivalent to the relative proportion of Bluefin Tuna trips
taken by members of each class in 2015. Nevertheless, our
estimate provides a reasonable starting point for compar-
ison with previous research as well as consideration of
allocation questions within the U.S. Bluefin Tuna fishery.
Using responses from a contingent valuation survey of
recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers (both private and char-
ter) in Hatteras, North Carolina, Stoll and Ditton (2006)
estimated an individual annual consumer surplus of $344
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for maintaining the quality of the Bluefin Tuna fishery
with the regulations in place at the time; because anglers
averaged 0.97 trips per year, this value essentially
amounted to a per-trip consumer surplus. While this value
is quite different from the consumer surplus estimates gen-
erated for each class in the present study ($1,684.72 and
$484.10 for class 1 and class 2, respectively), it does fall
in between the two values and raises the possibility that
the median estimate of $344 may represent an aggregation
of substantial heterogeneity in preferences among Bluefin
Tuna anglers such as those identified here.
Perhaps of greater policy relevance than aggregate con-
sumer surplus in the fishery is the marginal consumer sur-
plus, estimated to be $80.98 per pound of harvested
Bluefin Tuna. When considering the allocation of a fish-
ery’s quota among competing sectors—for example, com-
mercial and recreational—resource economists have
generally relied on some version of the equimarginal prin-
ciple, which dictates that an efficient allocation of the
resource occurs when the marginal net benefit of addi-
tional quota is equal among sectors. In 2015, commercial
ex-vessel prices (revenue) of Bluefin Tuna landed in the
United States ranged from $5.75 to $7.27/lb ($12.65–
$15.99/kg) (NMFS 2017), meaning that marginal profit
was even lower (ex-vessel price minus expenses). Based on
the equimarginal principle alone, it would appear econom-
ically efficient to increase the Angling category share of
the U.S. Bluefin Tuna quota. However, it is important to
remember that since the probability of Class 1 anglers tak-
ing a trip was 0.96, given 2015 average values, additional
effort resulting from increased stock abundance (catchabil-
ity), angling category allocation and/or liberalized regula-
tions would likely come from the more consumptively
oriented class 2 (whose probability of taking a trip, given
2015 average values, was only 0.27). Because class 2 con-
sumer surplus for the average 2015 trip was $484.10,
substantial increases in harvest (and thus allocation)
would be needed to result in a positive marginal consumer
surplus for class 2, while class 1 effort (and surplus) likely
would not change markedly with higher harvest levels,
though there would be some increase due to class 1’s posi-
tive WTP for harvest. As a result, increasing allocation
levels to the recreational Angling category may not signifi-
cantly improve the efficiency of the U.S. Bluefin Tuna
fishery as a whole.
While the model was effective at explaining the sources
of heterogeneity among recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers,
those sources—income and recent Bluefin Tuna targeting
—do not initially appear to be as salient to management
as, for example, regional heterogeneity. However, what
our results do show is a large amount of latent, or poten-
tial, effort in the fishery: the class 2 anglers who have not
targeted Bluefin Tuna recently, but who could plausibly
reenter the fishery if conditions—fish availability,
regulations, and costs—made it a worthwhile endeavor.
The availability of and regulations for alternative target
species, which were found to be diverse and region-specific
among respondents, could also play a significant role in
determining whether class 2 anglers decide to target Blue-
fin Tuna; for future studies, especially those on a smaller
geographic scale, it may be practical to consider these spe-
cies tradeoffs among anglers. With the most recent Atlan-
tic Bluefin Tuna stock assessment indicating that the
species is no longer experiencing overfishing (ICCAT
2017), managers should be wary that even a small increase
in daily Bluefin Tuna bag limits could result in a large
and sudden increase in participation and harvest. Their
consideration of the utility function of class 2 anglers (and
thus the “tipping point” at which inactive anglers could
reenter the fishery) could inform the degree to which regu-
lations should be liberalized in order to maintain landings
within the designated subquota.
Our application of a latent class logit model to deci-
sions made by recreational Bluefin Tuna anglers revealed
distinct heterogeneity in preferences among anglers, with
important implications for management. The use of latent
class models, as opposed to more conventional random-
parameters models, could prove useful in other recre-
ational fishery scenarios where class-specific management
—for example, regionally or by gear type—is a feasible
strategy. Our results could also help inform, through the
estimation of compensating surplus, the comparative wel-
fare impact of management alternatives that would meet
similar biological goals (though models and assumptions
regarding catch, harvest, and other conditions such as
resource access would be required; see Holzer and
McConnell 2014). By doing so, managers could best maxi-
mize the welfare of these user groups while maintaining
fishing mortality within biologically acceptable limits.
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TABLE A.1. Responses to non-DCE questions used to inform latent class choice modeling. Different lowercase letters indicate regional values that
are significantly different from one another (P = 0.05). Only respondents who previously stated that they had targeted Bluefin Tuna in the last 5 years
answered the question indicating how many trips they took in 2015 that targeted Bluefin Tuna.
Variable Description (sample size) Value
New
England
New York/
New Jersey Mid-Atlantic
Age Mean age in years (1,129) 56
Income % with annual
income > $150,000 (965)
37.8% 41.9% z 41.3% 30.4% y
Years targeting HMS Mean in years (1,111) 14.7
Bluefin Tuna targeting % who have targeted
Bluefin Tuna in last
5 years (1,143)
61.9% 76% z 66.1% z 43.5% y
2015 trips targeting Bluefin Tuna Mean in number of trips
(711)
3.12 4.2 z 2.6 y 2.1 y
Distance from port fished % who fished for Bluefin
Tuna < 25 miles from
port (686)
30.8% 54.4% z 10.9% y 19.7% y
Voluntarily release Bluefin Tuna % who ever voluntarily
released Bluefin Tuna
(683)
51.4%
Consumptive orientation % with consumptive
orientation (670)
39.3% 21.6% z 57.3% y 41.6% y
Season length preference % who prefer short, high-
harvest season (685)
38.8% 22% z 53% y 46.8% y
Appendix: Responses to Non-DCE Survey Questions
Examination of non-DCE survey questions provided
an initial framework for exploring angler attitudes and
preferences to test in choice modeling efforts (Table A.1).
For example, there appeared to be strong segmentation by
region, with anglers from New England coastal states
(n = 333) exhibiting distinct angling behaviors and
preferences compared with those from the New York/New
Jersey (n = 334) or mid-Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina; n = 313) regions. New
England anglers generally had higher incomes, targeted
Bluefin Tuna more frequently (both in terms of trips per
season and having targeted Bluefin Tuna in recent years),
were less consumptively oriented, and targeted Bluefin
Tuna closer to port than anglers from other regions. This
apparent heterogeneity was used to inform individual-
specific Z variables to incorporate into the latent class
model. While attitudes regarding the importance of
harvest showed a high degree of variation among
respondents, anglers appeared broadly willing to accept
some degree of reduction in harvest if it meant increased
fishery quality in future years: 78.3% of respondents
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “I would be
willing to accept a lower daily Bluefin Tuna bag limit if
doing so would help further rebuild Bluefin Tuna stocks
and allow for greater future fishing opportunities.” At the
same time, however, a majority of anglers (59.3%) agreed
or strongly agreed that they would never target Bluefin
Tuna if they were not allowed to harvest fish.
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TABLE A.2. Percent (%) of individuals in each class (absolute class assignment) who exhibit specific individual characteristics. A single asterisk (*)
denotes a significant difference in percentage between classes at P = 0.05; a double asterisk (**) denotes significance at P = 0.01. For the consumptive
and nonconsumptive orientation variables, sample size only includes those in each class who had targeted Bluefin Tuna in the last 5 years (n = 412 for
class 1, 255 for class 2).
Variable Description Class 1 (n = 523) Class 2 (n = 457)
Target Bluefin Tuna % who have targeted Bluefin Tuna in last 5 years 78.8** 55.7**
New England % New England permit holders 36.7 30.9
New York/New Jersey % New York/New Jersey permit holders 35.6 32.4
Mid-Atlantic % mid-Atlantic permit holders 27.7* 37.0*
Consumptive orientation % with consumptive orientation 35.2 37.3
Nonconsumptive orientation % with nonconsumptive orientation 33 28.2
High income % with annual income >$150,000 38.1* 28.6*
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